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TOURO LA WREVIEW
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE
TERM
People v. Morin'
(decided May 15, 2003)
Andre Morin was sentenced to six months in prison for
endangering the welfare of a child.2  Morin appealed his
conviction, claiming that his constitutional right to be present at
the material stages of trial, set forth in both the United States
Constitution3 and the New York State Constitution,4 were violated.'
He argued that his sentence required reversal because his
constitutional right not to be excluded from sidebar conferences
with prospective jurors and his constitutional right to be present
when the trial court takes evidentiary testimony from the
complaining witness in chambers had been violated.6  The
appellate division concluded that the trial court's failure to allow
the defendant and his attorney to make statements on the
defendant's behalf during the sentencing phase violated his
constitutional right to be represented by counsel at sentencing.7 As
' 763 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't. 2003).2 Id. at 706.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
' N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law..."
5 Morin, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
61d.
7 Id. at 707.
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a result, the court remanded the case to a different trial court judge
for re-sentencing 8
Morin was arrested for touching the genitals of an eleven-
year-old boy, having his genitals touched by the boy, and
attempting to engage in sexual conversation with him.9
Subsequently, Morin was charged with endangering the welfare of
a child and sexual abuse in the second degree pursuant to Sections
260.10(1)10 and § 130.60(2)" of the New York State Penal Law. -2
The jury acquitted Morin on the sexual abuse charge but convicted
him of endangering the welfare of a child. 3
On appeal, Morin argued that his constitutional right to be
present at the material stages of trial was violated when the trial
court excluded him from sidebar conferences with prospective
jurors and when the trial court took evidentiary testimony from the
complaining witness in chambers. 4  The appellate division
concluded that the record did not indicate that defendant was not
8 id.
9 Id. at 706.
'0 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 1999) states in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when:
He knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the
physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than
seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such child to
engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger
to his life or health.
"N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.60(2) (McKinney 1998) states in pertinent part: "A
person is guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree when he subjects another
person to sexual contact and when such other person is ... less than fourteen
years old."
12 Morin, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
13 id.
'
4 1d.
2004]
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present at all of the sidebar conferences during jury selection, nor
was there an indication that he was not present during the
complaining witness' testimony in chambers. 5 The record did
show, however, that Morin was absent from two voir dire
conferences. 6 The appellate court did not address the issue on a
constitutional basis; rather, the issue was addressed pursuant to a
statutory right.' 7 The court held that pursuant to Section 260.20 of
the Criminal Procedure Law," Morin's statutory right to be present
at voir dire side bars was not violated because issues of bias were
not discussed at those conferences.' 9 The appellate division,
however, did remand the case on the basis that Morin had a
constitutional right to be represented by counsel during the
sentencing phase."0
The New York Court of Appeals has held that a defendant
has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at the material
stages of a criminal trial.2' In People v. Morales,- Edwin Morales
was indicted for rape and sodomy against two of his stepchildren.23
'" Id. at 706-07.
16ld. at 707.
17 Morin, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
18 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 2002) states in pertinent part:
"A defendant must be personally present during the trial of an indictment. ..
'9 Morin, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 706-07.
'0 Id. at 707.
21 See People v. Velasco, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 1071 (1991) (stating that a
defendant has a due process right to be present at trial "to the extent that a fair
and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence . .. [and h]is presence is
required only where his absence would have a substantial effect on his ability to
defend."); see also People v. Morales, 606 N.E.2d 953, 957 (1992) ("defendant
must be personally present during the trial of an indictment").
22 606 N.E.2d at 953.
23 Id. at 954.
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During the trial, a competency hearing was conducted outside of
the jury's presence.2 ' The trial judge excluded the defendant from
the hearing but allowed his defense counsel to be present. 5
Questions relating to the two children's understanding about the
difference of telling the truth and a lie were asked.26 At the end of
the hearing, the trial court concluded that both children were
competent to testify. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted
of rape and sodomy. Defendant appealed, arguing that his
constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial were
violated because he was barred from the competency hearing. 7
The appellate division rejected defendant's claims, and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 8
For its analysis of whether the defendant was deprived of
the right to be present under New York State law, the court
analyzed the Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL").29 Pursuant to
Section 260.20 of the CPL, a defendant must be personally present
during the trial of an indictment. This statute serves two purposes:
preventing secret trials and guaranteeing the defendant's right to be
present at all important stages of the trial.3  The court held
defendant's absence from the competency hearing did not violate
any of his rights. 3' The court reasoned the hearing did not involve
24 Id.
25 Id. at 955.
26 Id
27 Morales, 606 N.E.2d at 955.
28 Id.
291Id at 957.
30 Id.
31 id.
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evidentiary testimony or issues about which defendant has shown
he has special knowledge.- Rather, the proceeding related to a
witness' testimonial capacity, which is a legal determination
unrelated to trial issues.33 The court concluded that under these
circumstances, there is "no greater right to be present under [the
New York] State Constitution than already provided by statute.""
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals held in People v.
Hannigan35 that it would be a violation of the New York State
Constitution to deprive a defendant of the right to counsel of his
choice at the time of sentencing.36
Similar to the New York courts, the United States Supreme
Court has also held that a defendant has a due process right "to be
present at the material stages of trial if his presence might bear a
substantial relationship to his opportunity to better defend himself
at trial."37  The Federal Constitution does not embody explicit
language conferring a right to be present "at any stage of a criminal
proceeding that is critical to its outcome."38 Rather, it is implicit.
It is a qualified privilege, not an absolute right. 9 In Kentucky v.
Stincer, ° the Supreme Court held that although a defendant does
3, Id. at 958.
31 Morales, 606 N.E.2d at 958.
34 1d.
31 165 N.E.2d 172 (1960).
36 Id. at 173 (stating that a defendant has a constitutional right to be
represented by "counsel of his choice at the time of the sentenc[ing] phase.").
37 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934)).31 Id. at 745.
39 Id.
40 482 U.S. at 730.
[Vol 20
5
Tan: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2004
DUE PROCESS
have a constitutional right to be present at any material stage of a
criminal proceeding, the defendant failed to demonstrate that his
presence at the competency hearing would have been useful in
ensuring a more reliable determination as to whether the witnesses
were competent to testify.4' As such, the defendant's due process
rights were not violated.42
In Stincer, the defendant, Sergio Stincer, was charged with
committing first-degree sodomy with three children.43 The trial
court conducted an in chambers competency hearing to determine
whether the girls were competent to testify." The trial court
allowed defense counsel to be present at the hearing but excluded
the defendant. 5 The judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel asked
questions to determine whether the two girls were capable of
remembering basic facts and whether they could distinguish being
truthful from lying.46 No questions regarding the substance of the
testimony were asked. Subsequently, the two girls were
subjected to direct and cross-examination during trial.4" Defense
counsel, after the conclusion of the testimony, did not request the
trial court to reconsider its ruling on the competency hearing.49 As
41 Id. at 747.
42 Id. at 745.
43 Id. at 732.
44 id.
41 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 732-33.
46 Id. at 733.
47 id.
41 Id. at 733-34.
49 Id. at 734.
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such, the defendant was convicted of first degree sodomy and was
sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant argued, among other grounds, that his
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was excluded from
the competency hearing. 1 The Supreme Court explained that a
defendant has "a due process right 'to be present in his own person
whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the
fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge."'' -2 The
privilege to be present is a qualified right. 3 This privilege is
inapplicable when defendant's presence will not substantially
affect the outcome of the case. 4  Therefore, if a defendant's
presence contributes to the fairness of the procedure, then the
defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome.55
The Court did not find any evidence to support Stincer's
due process claim.56 It reasoned that the particular nature of the
competency hearing was not one in which the substance of the
testimony was inquired." Rather, the questions during the
competency hearing were directed solely to each child's ability to
recollect and narrate facts, distinguish between truth and falsehood,
50 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 734.
"' Id. at 745.
52 Id. (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06)).
5' Id. at 745.
54 Id.
51 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 734.
56 id.
57 Id. at 745-46.
[Vol 20
7
Tan: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2004
DUE PROCESS
and to their sense of moral obligation to tell the truth." As such,
the Court held that Stincer's due process rights were not violated
by his exclusion from the competency hearing."
In conclusion, federal and New York holdings are similar
with respect to the interpretation of the right to be present at
material stages of a criminal trial. Under both the federal and New
York Constitutions, a defendant is afforded the right to be present
only if his presence "might bear a substantial relationship to his
opportunity to better defend himself."'  While the standard is
similar, the New York Court of Appeals held that this right is
explicitly guaranteed by the New York Constitution and New York
statutory provisions, whereas the United States Supreme Court
found this right to be implicitly guaranteed by the federal
Constitution.6 Furthermore, New York has incorporated much of
the constitutional requirement into statutes.62
Lauren Tan
5Id. at 746.
9 Id. at 745.60 See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745; Velasco, 570 N.E.2d at 1072.
61 See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 (holding that if a defendant's presence
contributes to the fairness of the procedure, then he or she is guaranteed the right
to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its
outcome); Velasco, 570 N.E.2d at 1072 ("[A]part from our statutory provision,
due process requires the presence of a defendant at his trial 'to the extent that a
fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent
only.').
62 Morales, 606 N.E.2d at 957.
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